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THE UNITED STATES AND THE DECLARATION
OF PARIS.
There is a probability that the accession of the United States
to the Declaration of Paris is shortly to be urged upon the Secre-
tary of State. In such event the reasons favoring this action
may well be worthy of our study. The articles of this important
international compact, made in 1856, at the close of the Crimean
War, were as follows:
i. Privateering is and remains abolished.
2. The neutral flag covers enemy's goods, with the exception of contra-
band of war.
3. Neutral goods, withthe exception of contraband of war, are not liable
to capture under enemy's flag.
4. Blockades in order to be binding must be effective, that is to say,,
maintained by a force sufficient really to prevent access to the coast of the
enemy.
This Declaration was to be binding only as between the parties
to it. Spain, Mexico, and the United States are the only commer-
cial states of importance which have thus far failed to give in their
adhesion, the two former being restrained by the. refusal of the
latter. The action of the United States was thus explained. The
policy of this country was against the maintenance of a large navy.
To supplement that navy in the work of commerce destroying
and of enforcing the rules of naval war against neutral trade,
the issue of letters of marque might be necessary. So that unless
the Declaration were so amended as to exempt all innocent pri-
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vate property, neutral or hostile, from capture, the accession of the
United States was declared impolitic. This Marcy amendment
was not carried, owing to the influence of Great Britain.
The question of accession again came up during the first year
of the war of the Rebellion. Dropping this Marcy idea, Mr.
Seward was willing to accede unconditionally. The obstacle came
from France and particularly from Great Britain. For Mr.
Seward was warned that the accession of his country could have
no retroactive effect to "invalidate anything already done," could
not be held, that is, to apply to the hostilities already broken out
between North and South; with this limitation understood it
would be accepted. Mr. Henry Adams in an interesting essay 1
enlarges upon the duplicity of Lord Russell in considering and
replying to this offer. But to my mind Mr. Seward was not
wholly blameless. For as always in the early years of the war
he was proceeding on the assumption that the United States could
not, and that foreign powers must not, recognize the belligerency
of the South. Now in point of fact the government of the North
had itself recognized Southern belligerency, by refusing to punish
the crews of Southern men of war as pirates in spite of the decis-
ion of the court (Prize Causes, 2 Black, 635), and by establish-
ing a blockade of Southern ports, which is a war measure.
Holland, France and Spain as well as great Britain had already
made formal recognition of the belligerency of the Confederate
States. President Davis had been asked to bind his country to
observe the rules of the Declaration and had declined. Under
these circumstances why was it not reasonable to impose, as a con-
dition upon a convention of accession, the proviso that the said
accession should be prospective merely and should not be held
applicable to the struggle at hand. But such a proviso conflicted
with that false and hampering theory that the North was not at
war with a belligerent power, and the offer of accession' was with-
drawn. This was more than thirty years ago. Now, however, in
a time of peace with no ulterior motives possible, the question of
accession is likely to be again brought forward and can be argued
on general grounds. The object of the present article is to make
very briefly a plea for such action.
As the article relating to paper blockades has been formally
advocated by this country, it may be left out of consideration.
The three other provisions of the Declaration may be arranged in
a balance sheet, somewhat as follows:
I Historical Essays by Henry Adams. Scribner's, x8gi.
THE DECLARA TION 0-F PARIS.
The United States in account with the signatories of the
Declaration of Paris -
Dr. Cr.
For adoption of rules that For renunciation of the right to
(i) Free ships make free goods. commission privateers.
(2) Enemy ships do not infect the
neutral goods on board.
E. & 0. E.
The following propositions are laid down without argument as
,our premises:
i. The interests of the United States are on the whole on the side of
neutral rather than of belligerent rights.
2. The two rules on the debtor side of the balance are already adopted by
-he policy of the United States.
3. If the United States should engage in war, the chances are largely that
such war would be with a power weaker than itself in its war navy and naval
resources.
The history of the American carrying trade during the Napo-
leonic wars, is a striking illustration of the value of neutral privi-
leges. Although our ships had no right to shelter enemy goods
under their neutral flag; although the doctrine of occasional contra-
band enforced by Great Britain, sometimes softened into preemp-
tion, greatly interfered with our chief article of export, provisions;
although the restrictive decrees of each belligerent, culminating in
the utterly unjust and unlawful paper blockades declared by both,
at times threw our trade into confusion; nevertheless American
tonnage increased thirty, sixty, even one hundred, thousand tons
per year.
If the economists are correct we are probably now approaching
a time when our vanished foreign carrying trade will revive.
Cheaper production will enable our manufacturers to exchange
commodities with foreign countries more freely. Cheaper ships
operating under less repressive shipping and port regulations, will
reach out for their share of our own increased commerce, and of
the commerce of the world. What does such trade need in view
of the chances of war between our friends? It needs first fixed
and stable conditions: second, the greatest freedom possible, the
least possible interference from the exercise of belligerent rights.
Now very little argument is required to show that in these respects
the neutral shipper is better off under the Declaration, than the
neutral shipper without it. Suppose war between Great Britain
and France. Dutch or Danish ships, under the Declaration, could
carry French goods not contraband nor bound to a blockaded port
safely, while on a United States ship, those same goods being
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unprotected by the Declaration would be liable to capture. Under
such circumstances French goods would seek other flags than
ours. And again, since France until the Declaration condemned
neutral goods sailing under an enemy's flag, and since the Declar-
ation binds its members only as relates to one another, every ton
of American wheat, every bale of American cotton, borne on an
English ship would be subject to capture by French cruisers.
This state of things would be similarly true in the event of any
war between our friends unless a prior treaty with them forbade.
We have treaties which lay down the principle of "free ships, free
goods," with Spain, Russia, Prussia, Italy, and Sweden alone of
important commercial powers. Probably France alone would
claim the right to condemn our goods for seeking carriage on her
enemy's ships. Under the principles stated it is clear that our
neutral ships could not compete on even terms with other neutral
ships for the carrying trade. And if France were a belligerent
our goods might be subject to great inconvenience and even
danger. The rights of the Declaration then are of vital importance.
Turn now to the credit side of the account and notice what we
should be obliged to surrender as the equivalent for these benefits,
the right to commission privateers. It is the clinging to this right
which has hitherto stood in our way.
It is not a little curious, that while insisting upon the right to
issue letters of marque to subjects of other countries, the United
States forbids its own subjects by statutes of 1797 and i816, to
take part in the equipment or manning of privateers to act against
nations with which it is at peace. While retaining this demoral-
izing form of warfare, it denies to its citizens the right to share
in its profits when other nations, employ it. From this fact may
fairly be drawn the inference that privateering is a trade of which
this country in the abstract disapproves. More than this the
United States has negotiated eleven treaties which reciprocally
contain the same prohibition.
The value of privateering is still further narrowed when we
consider what it accomplishes. As the distinction in build and
equipment and armament between men of war and other ships
grows more marked, the privateer grows less important in waging
war. War in the sense of an exercise of force upon armed ships
is not really the object of privateering. Its reason for being lies
in its capacity for attacking an enemy's commerce, which while
primarily enriching the privateersman incidentally benefits the
state commissioning him. He may also, though less readily, be
useful in enforcing the laws relating to the carrying of contraband
and to blockade. But, to-day, war navies are themselves built for
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a twofold purpose, the heavy armored ships for fighting, the
fast protected or unarmored cruisers with large coal capacity for
preying upon commerce and enforcing belligerent rights against
the neutral. The rise of ships of this latter class, virtually doing
a privateer's work. detracts from the necessity for his existence.
His importance is lessened by still another consideration. The
value of privateering should be estimated not only absolutely but
relatively. It helps the weaker naval power relatively more than
the stronger. Its abolition was the reason, for instance, which
induced Great Britain, the strongest of all naval powers, to con-
sent to allow the neutral to carry her enemy's goods free under
his flag. This surrender of a right consistently exercised by
Great Britain since the time of the Consolato del Mare, was a very
great concession.
Granting the premise that the United States is more likely to be
at war with a p6wer weaker in naval resources than itself, than
with one stronger, it follows that privateering, considered apart
from any equivalent gained in return for its abolition, would be
more valuable to other countries than to us. .The safety of our
own commerce is more important than the destruction of the
commerce of such an enemy.
If these arguments are sound, the United States is in this
position. A very valuable privilege, involving a freedom of
neutral trade which would put it on the same footing with the
most favored nations, is offered it in exchange for the abolition of
privateering.
It disapproves of privateering in the abstract. It forbids its
citizens to engage in it when neutral. It has not itself employed
privateers for two thirds of a century. It has ships which can
do a privateer's work better than a privateersman, and with fewer
evil results. Privateering would by the doctrine of chances help
our enemies more than ourselves. In itself considered the reten-
tion of the right to commission privateers is not valuable to the
United States. When the equivalent gained by its abolition is
kept in view, the argument for accession to the Declaration of
Paris is overwhelming.
The freedom from capture of all innocent private property at
sea, even an enemy's, is the next step in the neutral programme.
Our accession to the Declaration should help towards this. Our
accession should be coupled with that of Spain and Mexico. A
foreign war affecting American commerce may break out at any
time and with scant warning. If our accession to the Declaration
is a proper step, it should be taken now.
Theodore S. Woolsey.
